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ARTICLE 
Troubled Water: An Examination of the 
NPDES Permit Shield 
STEPHANIE RICH 
 
In the past three years, a series of court decisions have left 
the federal circuits split over liability protection under the Clean 
Water Act (CWA). The CWA contains a provision known as the 
“permit shield” that protects the holder of a valid permit from 
citizen suits and enforcement actions so long as the holder 
complies with the provisions of its permit.1  Like much of law, 
what seems to be a fairly straightforward provision has actually 
given rise to enormous debate among the regulated community 
and public interest groups. The issue in the recent case law 
revolves primarily around what it means to comply with one’s 
permit and whether a permit holder may invoke the permit shield 
defense even without adequately disclosing pollutants in the 
application process. Even more significant is the question of to 
what extent the permit shield applies in the context of general 
permits—one of the two major permits under the CWA. 
In this comment I argue for a narrow interpretation of the 
CWA permit shield by analyzing the recent federal cases 
addressing the shield’s scope. A narrow interpretation calls for a 
greater level of compliance and disclosure on behalf of the permit 
holder in order to invoke the shield’s protection. This argument 
also includes a higher standard of “reasonable contemplation” of 
pollutants on the part of the regulator. The first section of this 
comment gives a brief background of the CWA, the National 
 
 Stephanie Rich received her B.A. from the University of Virginia in 2011 
and her J.D. from the University of Richmond School of Law in 2015. She is a 
member of the Virginia Bar and currently practices environmental law in 
Washington, DC.  
1. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).  
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Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), and the 
permit shield provision. The next section presents the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) policy on the shield, 
and introduces foundational case law. The comment then 
provides an overview of the issues and court decisions that have 
governed the recent debate over the scope of the permit shield. 
Lastly, the comment considers the important implications of the 
court decisions and the underlying arguments surrounding the 
dispute. Ultimately, I find that a narrow construction should 
apply because this interpretation adheres most closely to the 
fundamental premise of the CWA—to protect the waters of the 
United States. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Clean Water Act NPDES Permitting System 
In 1972, Congress created what is commonly known as the 
Clean Water Act in order to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”2  
Congress replaced the ineffective state-based regulatory program 
with a national permitting system based on federal and state 
cooperation. The mechanisms to achieve the Act’s goal include: a 
strict prohibition on discharges of pollutants without a permit, 
technology-based pollutant controls, and state-issued water 
quality standards.3  Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person from any point source 
into navigable waters of the United States.4 Congress created a 
major exception to this strict liability standard under the CWA 
with two permit programs, one of which is the Section 402 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).5  
The NPDES program requires facilities to acquire a permit to 
discharge pollutants from certain point sources into designated 
U.S. waters.6  Congress authorized EPA or an approved state 
 
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
3. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1314, 1313. 
4. Id. § 1311(a). 
5. Id. § 1342. The other permitting program under the CWA is in Section 
404, regulating dredged or fill material. Id. § 1344.  
6. Id. § 1342.  
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/3
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agency to issue the permits. Currently, there are forty-six states 
that have authorized state permitting programs.7 
There are two main types of permits under the NPDES 
permitting program—an individual permit and a general permit.8  
An individual permit is one that the regulator issues to a specific 
entity or source. The issuance of an individual permit requires an 
informal agency adjudication process for approval in which the 
permitting authority drafts a permit that is specifically tailored 
to a particular facility.9  General permits, on the other hand, 
cover one or more categories of discharges belonging to separate 
facilities within the same geographic or political region.10  Since 
1979, general permits have covered thousands of point sources 
and have authorized discharges from a variety of sources, 
including municipal and industrial stormwater systems and 
concentrated animal feeding operations.11 
The CWA states that NPDES permittees must comply with 
all the relevant requirements for a discharge.12  Generally, a 
NPDES permit contains five types of provisions. The first is 
Technology-Based Effluent Limitations.13  These are limitations 
on discharges depending on the available technology and cost.14  
EPA establishes national effluent guidelines that address the 
applicable limitation for certain types of facilities.15  If EPA does 
not have written guidelines for a certain industry group, then a 
permit writer is required to use his or her “best professional 
judgment” in developing a technology-based limit.16  The second 
provision in a permit is Water-Quality-Based Effluent 
Limitations. These are limitations determined by the impact of a 
pollutant on receiving waters and are used if the Technology-
 
7. Specific State Program Status, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/ 
npdes/basics/State-Program-Status.cfm [http://perma.cc/XR56-7DSS].  
8. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21 (2015). 
9. See generally OFF. WASTEWATER MGMT., EPA, WATER PERMITTING 101 
(1999), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/basics/upload/101pape.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/JVU6-AXRH]. 
10. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a). 
11. See id. § 122.28(b). 
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2012). 
13. 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(a)(1). 
14. Id. 
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). 
16. See id. § 1342(a)(1)(B). 
3
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Based Effluent limitations are not sufficient to meet the 
applicable water quality standards.17  The permit also typically 
contains monitoring and reporting requirements.18  The NPDES 
permit will specify how and when a facility must perform 
sampling for certain pollutants.19  Standard conditions must also 
be included in every NPDES permit.20  These conditions include 
requirements such as a duty to properly operate a facility, report 
any anticipated noncompliance, and notify the proper authority of 
any changes to the facility.21  Finally, a NPDES permit may also 
contain requirements that are deemed appropriate for a specific 
facility.22 
In applying for an individual NPDES permit, applicants 
must submit an application within 180 days of the discharge and 
provide EPA or an authorized state the required information 
about the facility.23  Applicants must disclose significant detail 
about the pollutants the facility expects to release. Information 
that is required varies depending on whether the facility is an 
existing or new point source, or discharging only non-process 
water.24  Generally, among the information EPA requires are 
facility and receiving waters locations, the facility’s operations, 
sampling of wastewater, quantitative data on the pollutants, and 
a listing of all toxic pollutants.25 
The application process for the general permit differs from 
that of the individual permit. In issuing a general permit, the 
permit writer determines whether data collected from facilities 
warrants a general permit. The regulator considers whether there 
are important similarities between the facilities that allow them 
to operate under one permit. In making this determination, the 
permit writer considers factors such as: whether the facilities 
discharge the same pollutants, use similar disposal practices, 
require the same monitoring, and whether it would be practical to 
 
17. Id. §§ 1312(a),1342(a)(1)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d).   
18. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(4). 
19. Id. § 122.41(j). 
20. See id. §§ 122.41–122.42. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. §§ 122.43(a).  
23. Id. § 122.21(c)(1), (f). 
24. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.21. 
25. Id. § 122.21(g)(1), (3), (7)(i), (9). 
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control the facilities under a general permit instead of an 
individual permit.26  Once the general permit has gone through a 
notice and comment phase, the permit writer issues the permit 
with the appropriate limitations and provisions for the facilities 
under the permit’s coverage.27  A discharger seeking coverage 
under a general permit after the permit has already been issued, 
must submit a notice of intent.28  The notice of intent must 
contain information essential to implementing the program, 
including the name and address of the operator and facility, the 
type of facility or discharges, and the receiving streams.29  Once 
the permit writer reviews the notice of intent, he or she will grant 
the facility coverage under the general permit, ask for additional 
information from the facility, or recommend that the facility 
apply for an individual permit.30 
Since the agency relies heavily on the information an 
applicant provides about the nature of its discharges, “disclosures 
made by permit applicants about their operations and waste 
streams are critical to the success of the overall permitting 
scheme.”31  Once an authorized agency reviews the permit 
application for completeness and accuracy, a permit writer will 
use the national effluent guidelines, the information submitted by 
the applicant, and his or her experience, in drafting permits to 
determine what will be listed as a pollutant and what limitations 
will be set on those discharges.32 
B.  The Permit Shield Provision 
Under the CWA, dischargers who have valid NPDES permits 
and comply with the conditions of those permits are free from 
enforcement actions relating to those discharges.33  This is 
 
26. Id. § 122.28(a)(2)(i)–(ii). 
27. Id. § 123.61. 
28. Id. § 122.28(b)(2). 
29. Id.  
30. OFF. WASTEWATER MGMT., supra note 9. 
31. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 619 (EAB 1999).  
32. See EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL 3-3, (2010), https://www3. 
epa.gov/npdes/pubs/pwm_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7HC-CAZ5] [hereinafter 
NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL].  
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2012). 
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referred to as the “permit shield.”34  The statute provides, 
“[c]ompliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall 
be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections [309] and [505] . . . 
with sections [301], [302], [306], [307], and [403] . . .  except any 
standard imposed under section [307] for a toxic pollutant 
injurious to human health.”35  Section 309 and 505 pertain to 
state enforcement and citizen suits.36  Sections 301, 302, 306, 
307, and 403 relate to standards for dischargers.37 
Congress intended for the permit shield to give permittees 
insulation from changes in regulations during the life of the 
permit. The House Report provides: “The purpose of this 
provision is to assure that the mere promulgation of any effluent 
limitation or any limitation, a standard, or thermal discharge 
regulation, by itself will not subject a person to holding a valid 
permit to prosecution.”38  For instance, EPA will occasionally 
update the effluent limitations for certain categories of 
discharges.39  The shield gives a permittee protection from having 
to meet more stringent requirements issued by EPA until the 
permit expires or is modified or reissued.40  The provision 
therefore provides some comfort to permittees as a defense 
against government and citizen suit actions regarding claims a 
permit is not sufficiently strict.41 
Much to the frustration of the courts, the legislative history 
gives no guidance as to how far the protection of the permit 
provision actually reaches. Does the shield apply to pollutants not 
listed in the permit? What level of disclosure by the permit holder 
is required to trigger the permit shield defense? Does the shield 
apply to only individual permits? In light of this statutory 
ambiguity, it is appropriate to defer to the reasonable 
interpretation of the agency. 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. §§ 1319, 1365. 
37. Id. §§1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1343. 
38. H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 128 (1972). 
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d). 
40. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977). 
41. See id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/3
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C. EPA’s Interpretation of the Permit Shield 
EPA has made several policy statements on the scope the 
permit shield’s coverage.42  In a 1976 memorandum, EPA 
clarified that it intends for a permit to give general authorization 
to discharge, subject only to the conditions and limitations 
contained in the permit.43  In 1994, EPA issued a more thorough 
policy document discussing the application of the shield to certain 
categories of pollutants identified in the permit. These pollutants 
included: 
1)  Pollutants specifically limited in the permit or pollutants 
which the permit, fact sheet, or administrative record explicitly 
identify as controlled through indicator parameters 
2) Pollutants for which the permit authority has not established 
limits or other permit conditions, but which are specifically 
identified in writing as present in facility discharges during the 
permit application process and contained in the administrative 
record which is available to the public; and 
3)  Pollutants not identified as present but which are 
constituents of wastestreams, operations or processes that were 
clearly identified in writing during the permit application process 
and contained in the administrative record which is available to 
the public.44 
EPA also noted in its 1994 policy that the shield extends to 
general permits.45  The Agency stated that general permits allow 
for discharges within the specified scope of the particular 
 
42. See Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, Deputy Assistant Adm’r for 
Water Enf’t, to Reg’l Enf’t Dir., Region V (Apr. 28, 1976), http://www3. 
epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm489.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B9Y-HEZ9]; Memorandum 
from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A. Herman & Jean C. Nelson, Assistant Adm’rs 
& Gen. Counsel, to Reg’l Adm’rs & Reg’l Counsels (July 1, 1994), 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm615.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBE4-9TH8]; 
Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A. Herman & Jean C. Nelson, 
Assistant Adm’rs & Gen. Counsel, to Reg’l Adm’rs & Reg’l Counsels (Apr. 11, 
1995), http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0131.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP9A-
V5CL]. It should be noted that two of these guidance documents followed shortly 
after Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co. and were in response 
to some questions that were raised by the court’s holding. 
43. Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, supra note 42.  
44. Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A. Herman & Jean C. 
Nelson (July 1, 1994), supra note 42, at 2.  
45. Id. at 3.  
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permit.46  EPA specified that as long as the discharger complies 
with the permit conditions, including the pollutant limits, 
notification requirements, and other conditions, the permit shield 
will apply.47 
Finally, EPA explicitly discusses three circumstances in 
which the permit shield does not apply. In the case of individual 
permits, an NPDES permit does not authorize discharge of 
pollutants from wastestreams, operations, or processes that 
“existed at the time of the permit application and which were not 
clearly identified during the application process.”48  EPA states, 
however, that if a permit holder makes changes to its discharges, 
the shield also applies to these changes so long as the discharger 
abides by the notification requirements.49 
D.  The Early Decisions: Atlantic States, Ketchikan, and 
Piney Run 
The first three major cases to address the scope of the permit 
shield were the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak,50 the 
Environmental Appeals Board’s Ketchikan Pulp,51 and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s Piney Run Preservation 
Association v. County Commissioners of Carroll County.52  All 
three decisions granted the shield’s coverage for pollutants that 
are not expressly listed in a permit. These cases serve as the 
foundation for the recent and pending cases over the permit 
shield, with permit holders seeking to expand the reach of their 
holdings. 
In Atlantic States, an environmental group filed suit against 
Eastman Kodak, a company that operated a facility that 
manufactured photographic products and laboratory chemicals in 
Rochester, New York.53  Kodak also operated a wastewater 
treatment plant that would remove harmful pollutants from the 
 
46. Id.  
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 2 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41(1), 122.42(a)–(b) (1994)). 
50. 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1994). 
51. 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 1998). 
52. 268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001). 
53. Atl. States, 12 F.3d at 354. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/3
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facility before discharging them into the Genesee River.54  The 
plaintiff environmental group, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, 
alleged that Kodak exceeded the effluent limits in its state-issued 
permit.55  The group also claimed Kodak was liable for 
discharging sixteen pollutants that were not listed in its NPDES 
permit.56  The court found that “[o]nce within the NPDES 
scheme, polluters may discharge pollutants not specifically listed 
in their permits so long as they comply with the appropriate 
reporting requirements and abide by any new limitations when 
imposed on such pollutants.”57  The court recognized, as EPA 
addressed in its guidance policies, that it would be too restrictive 
to prohibit all other pollutants not listed in the permit.58  
However, the court also emphasized that full disclosure is an 
essential prerequisite to allowing the permit shield defense.59 
Four years later, the EPA Environmental Appeals Board 
(EAB) followed similar reasoning as the Second Circuit in 
Ketchikan Pulp. In Ketchikan, EPA’s Region 10 filed suit against 
Ketchikan Pulp Company (KPC), a pulp mill, for having drained 
a two-year accumulation of flocculant60 into Ward Cove through a 
flocculant drain line.61  KPC also released untreated cooking acid 
into Ward Cove.62  EPA claimed that these specific discharges 
were not covered by KPC’s permit.63  KPC’s NPDES permit laid 
out effluent limitations for five conventional pollutants but 
nowhere did it mention limitations for flocculent, cooking acid, or 
industrial spills.64  In its defense, KPC argued that the 
discharges were “implicitly” covered by the permit and therefore 
protected by the permit shield.65  The Board disagreed, 
 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 355. 
56. Id. at 356–57. 
57. Id. at 357.  
58. Id. 
59. Atl. States, 12 F.3d at 358. 
60. Flocculants are used in water treatment processes to help 
sedimentation or filtration of small particles. See, e.g., FLOCCULANTS.INFO, http:// 
www.flocculants.info/ [https://perma.cc/A2DW-3QGH]. 
61. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 609–10 (EAB 1998). 
62. Id. at 609. 
63. Id. at 612. 
64. Id. at 611. 
65. Brief for Respondent at 11, Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 
1998) (No. CWA-1089-12-22-309(g)).  
9
RICH - FINAL 4/26/2016  1:43 PM 
2016] TROUBLING WATERS 259 
emphasizing that unlisted pollutants may fall under a permit’s 
coverage only if the permittee meets the Agency’s disclosure 
standards.66 KPC, unlike Kodak, failed to meet EPA’s disclosure 
policy.67 Here, the Board concluded, there was no evidence that 
KPC disclosed its flocculent discharge practices or any 
anticipated chemical spills.68 Additionally, the Board found the 
permitting authority had no reason to anticipate such releases.69 
In the 2001 case Piney Run Preservation, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with Ketchikan and 
Atlantic States in finding that EPA’s disclosure standards were 
valid.70  In Piney Run, the plaintiffs file suit against Carroll 
County, claiming that the county-operated waste treatment plant 
was unlawfully discharging warm water into Piney Run.71  In 
Piney Run the court addressed two questions: “what comprises 
the scope or terms of an NPDES permit” and “whether the permit 
shield bars CWA liability for discharges not expressly allowed by 
the permit when the holder has complied with the permit’s 
express restrictions.”72 
In examining the central issue, the court followed the 
Chevron analysis and first looked to the plain language of the 
statute.73  If the congressional intent behind the statute was clear 
then the court would not need to conduct any further analysis.74  
Section 402(k) of the CWA states, “compliance with a permit 
issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance. . .”75  
The court agreed with Atlantic States in finding that this crucial 
 
66. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. at 621. 
67. Id.  
68. Id. at 626, 632. 
69. Id. at 629, 639.. 
70. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255, 
267–68 (4th Cir. 2001). 
71. Id. at 259. 
72. Id. at 266. 
73. Id. at 267. The court here applies step one of the Chevron analysis, 
which is to first answer “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842 (1984). 
74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“[T]he court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously express intent of Congress.”). 
75. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) 
(2012)).  
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/3
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language is ambiguous and does not explain the scope of the 
permit shield.76 
The court then applied step two of the Chevron analysis and 
found that the EPA’s interpretation in Ketchikan was a rational 
construction of the statute.77  Following the test from Ketchikan, 
the court explained that “the Commissioners would be in 
violation of their NPDES permit through the Plant’s discharge of 
heat if either: (1) the permit specifically barred such discharges; 
or (2) the Commissioners did not adequately disclose [the 
discharge to the Maryland Department of the Environment 
(MDE)].”78 
The plaintiffs in Piney Run argued that because there was a 
short footnote stating “the discharge of pollutants not shown shall 
be illegal,”79 the defendant permittee had clearly violated the 
terms of the statute. The court, however, was not persuaded. The 
court found that there was no extrinsic evidence showing that 
MDE actually intended the permit to be that strict.80  Indeed, the 
court concluded that if the footnote had been that important then 
the text would not have been so buried within the permit.81  As to 
the second prong, the court found that there was evidence that 
the Commissioners had disclosed heat discharges and that MDE 
had contemplated them.82  The commissioners had informed 
MDE of the heat during the permitting process and the record 
contained a compilation of the daily reports on water temperature 
and heat discharges provided by the Commissioners to the 
MDE.83  Since the Commissioners had met both prongs, the court 
ultimately held that the Commissioners were protected by the 
permit shield and were not liable under the CWA.84 
 
76. Id.; see also Atl. States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353, 
357–58 (2d Cir. 1993). 
77. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267. Step two of the Chevron 
analysis states that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
78. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 269. 
79. Id. at 270 (internal quotations omitted).  
80. Id. at 270–71. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 271–72.  
83. Id.  
84. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 271–72. 
11
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II. THE RECENT ISSUES 
After a twelve-year lull, courts began to revisit the question 
of how much protection the shield actually affords. A series of 
cases from 2013 to 2015 dealt with numerous issues arising from 
both the lack of clarity in the CWA provisions and industry’s 
attempt to limit liability for releasing contaminants. Among the 
questions presented were whether a failure to disclose a 
discharge during the permitting process bars the permit shield 
defense, whether failure to comply with all provisions of an 
NPDES permit bars protection, and whether the shield is 
available to general permits. The following section provides a 
discussion of this recent case law. Note, that even though these 
cases fall within such a close time period of one another, the 
courts come to widely different conclusions about the application 
of the shield.85 
The 2013 case, Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. 
Marfork Coal, narrowed slightly the scope of the permit shield in 
the context of the individual NPDES permit by finding that a 
permit holder could be in violation of its permit even when there 
is no effluent limitation set for the pollutant.86  In Marfork, four 
environmental groups filed suit against Marfork Coal Company 
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West 
Virginia.87  The plaintiffs claimed, among other allegations, that 
Marfork violated the CWA by discharging selenium from one of 
its surface mines into a nearby stream.88  Marfork’s permit 
expressly limited the discharge of certain pollutants including 
iron, manganese, and aluminum, but did not expressly limit 
selenium.89  The court stated that, “assuming selenium was 
adequately disclosed as a discharge” during the application phase 
and was thus within the reasonable contemplation of the state 
authority, “Marfork would not be in violation of the CWA.”90 
 
85. Also, note that there is little reference from one court case to another 
since most of the cases were pending at the same time and, therefore, had little 
persuasive value to one another. 
86. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Marfork Coal Co., 966 F. Supp. 2d 667, 
689 (S.D.W. Va. 2013). 
87. Id. at 667. 
88. Complaint at 1, Marfork, 966 F. Supp. 2d. 667 (No. 5:12-1464).  
89. Marfork, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 671. 
90. Id. at 682. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/3
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However, there was another relevant section in the permit 
that stated “[t]he discharge or discharges covered by a 
WV/NPDES permit are to be of such quality so as not to cause 
violation of applicable water quality standards.”91  The court 
found that the permit “explicitly authorizes the discharge of 
selenium only to the extent that it does not cause a violation of 
water quality standards.”92  The court rejected Marfork’s 
argument that pointed to similarities between Marfork’s permit 
and the permits disputed in Piney Run and Atlantic States.93  
More specifically, the court discussed that the defendants in 
Piney Run and Atlantic States possessed permits that implicitly 
allowed discharges after they were contemplated by the 
permitting authority, while the cross-reference to water quality 
standards in Marfork’s permit actually contained a provision 
expressly prohibiting selenium.94 
In the 2014 case Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards 
v. A & G Coal, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether 
a company’s failure to disclose the discharge of selenium barred 
the shield defense.95  The defendant, A & G Coal Corp., operated 
a coal mine in Wise County, Virginia and identified the surface 
mine as the source of runoff to two ponds and groundwater.96  
Environmental groups, including Southern Appalachian 
Mountain Stewards, sampled the identified ponds and found that 
they contained selenium, a chemical not listed in A & G’s 
permit.97  Regulations require that for a primary industry to 
discharge “process wastewater” it must report quantitative data 
on pollutants, including selenium, listed in the application.98  The 
applicant must notify the authorizing agency as to the presence 
 
91.  Id.  
92.  Id. at 685. This is a generic provision that is provided in almost all 
NDPES permits. 
93.  Marfork raised the similarity that plaintiffs in all three cases “claimed 
violations of statutory and regulatory provisions purporting to make illegal the 
discharge of any pollutant not expressly allowed under the permit.” Id. 
94.  Id. 
95.  S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560, 
561 (4th Cir. 2014). 
96.  Id.  
97.  Id. at 562. 
98.  Id. at 563; see 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 9 § 25-31-100(H)(7)(e)(2); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.21(g)(7)(vi)(B) (2015). 
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or absence of the pollutants on the list.99  A & G did not report 
any data on selenium in its application.100  A & G claimed that 
because it neither knew nor had reason to believe that the 
discharge contained selenium that it complied with the 
application requirements.101 
The court rejected A & G’s argument that it only needed to 
mention selenium if it knew or had reason to believe that the 
element was present in the discharges. The court stated that A & 
G’s interpretation “turns the presumptions of the CWA on their 
head.”102  In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that A & G 
failed to meet the first prong of the Piney Run test.103  The first 
prong of the Piney Run test states that a permit holder may be 
shielded from liability if the “permit holder complies with the 
express terms of the permit and with the Clean Water Act’s 
disclosure requirements.”104  In determining whether A & G met 
this prong, the court considered 1) whether A & G had provided 
adequate information to Department of Mine, Minerals, and 
Energy (DMME) and 2) whether the selenium discharges were 
within the reasonable contemplation of DMME.105  The Fourth 
Circuit stated that the agency needs this information to make a 
fully informed decision when issuing the permit.106  Otherwise, 
the court explains, the lack of disclosure would “encourage willful 
blindness by those discharging pollutants and prevents the . . . 
agencies . . . from receiving the information necessary to 
effectively safeguard the environment.”107  Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for the plaintiffs.108 
The Ninth Circuit recently came close to ruling on whether 
the permit shield applies to a general permit in the case Alaska 
 
99. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPLICATION FORM 2C - WASTEWATER 
DISCHARGE INFORMATION 3 (1990), http://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/3510-2C.pdf 
[https:// perma.cc/F62D-VNQL]. 
100. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 F.3d at 566. 
101. Brief for Appellant at 21, S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 
F.3d 560 (No. 13-2050). 
102. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 F.3d at 566. 
103. Id. at 565–66. 
104. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255, 
259 (4th Cir. 2001). 
105. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 F.3d at 565. 
106. Id. at 566. 
107. Id. at 567. 
108. Id. at 562, 570.  
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Community Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Services.109  The 
Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s holding that the 
defendants were shielded from liability under the CWA for 
discharging coal into Resurrection Bay.110  The Seward Loading 
Facility, which is owned and operated by the defendants, 
transfers coal onto ships through a conveyor system.111  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the conveyor occasionally spills coal into 
the bay.112  The defendants claimed that the spills were covered 
by the defendants’ Multi-Sector General Permit.113  The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed and found that the plain terms of the general 
permit prohibit the discharge of coal.114  The court focused on the 
language in the permit that required that all discharges not 
authorized by a NPDES permit be eliminated.115  The court 
concluded that, because the list of permissible non-stormwater 
discharges did not include coal, the discharge of coal ash was a 
violation of the permit.116  The court noted that it need not 
discuss whether the permit shield applies to general permits, but 
that if the Piney Run analysis did apply, the result would be the 
same because the defendants had not complied with the “express 
terms of the General Permit.”117 
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Sixth Circuit 
offered a more direct analysis of whether the permit shield 
applies to the general permit.118  In Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, 
the Sierra Club filed suit against ICG’s Thunder Ridge Mine for 
allegedly violating the conditions of its state-issued general 
permit (KPDES permit).119  ICG, located in Leslie County, 
Kentucky, discharged amounts of selenium that exceeded 
 
109. Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Servs., LLC, 765 F.3d 
1169 (9th Cir. 2014). 
110. Id. at 1172. 
111. Id. 
112. Complaint at 6, Alaska. Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy 
Servs., LLC, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Alaska 2013) (No. 90CV00255). 
113. Id. at 4. 
114. Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics, 765 F.3d at 1172.  
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1173. 
117. Id. at 1173–74. 
118. Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, No. 11-148-GFVT, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 146140 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2012). 
119. Id. at *4. 
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Kentucky’s numeric and narrative water quality standards.120  
The KPDES permit placed effluent limitations on pollutants such 
as solids, iron, and manganese but did not place any limits on 
selenium.121  Rather, the KPDES permit required “each existing 
mining operation authorized by this general permit [to] conduct 
and submit . . . a one-time analysis for . . . selenium.”122  The 
Sierra Club argued that the fact that ICG’s selenium discharges 
were not limited in the KPDES permit did not allow the company 
to invoke the permit shield defense.123  The Sierra Club 
contended that “because the permitting authority lacks detailed 
information about individual discharges when issuing a general 
permit, the scope of a general permit is defined by the effluent 
limitations present in the permit,” and, therefore, the scope of the 
permit shield for a general permit should be narrower than the 
shield of an individual permit.124 
The district court, however, rejected Sierra Club’s argument 
and came to a different conclusion.125  The court highlighted a 
major difference between an individual permit and general 
permit during the application process.126  During the application 
for an individual permit, the permit applicant is required to 
disclose information and is at fault if the applicant does not 
disclose appropriate information.127  By contrast, a general 
permit requires very minimal information from the facility during 
the permitting phase.128  It is the duty of the permit writer to 
request any additional information.129  If that information is not 
 
120. Id. at *6 (citing 401 Ky. Admin. Regs. 10:031 §§ 2(1)(d), 4(1)(f), (6)).  
121. Id. at *11. 
122. Id.  
123. Id. ICG relied on the 1995 EPA Policy Statement addressing the scope 
of the permit shield. See id. at *16–17. 
124. Sierra Club Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, ICG Hazard, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146140 (No. 11-CV-148-GFVT). 
125. ICG Hazard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11–28. 
126. Id. at *19. The court refered to the General Permit Guidance in stating 
“the only significant difference is that ‘a larger share of the responsibility for the 
information gathering process leading up to the development of a general permit 
falls on the permitting rather than on the permit applicants.’” Id. (quoting 
OFFICE OF WATER ENF’T & PERMITS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GENERAL PERMIT 
PROGRAM GUIDANCE 1, 33–34 (1988) [hereinafter GENERAL PERMIT GUIDANCE]).  
127. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Sierra Club, at 20–21, Sierra 
Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-5086). 
128. ICG Hazard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *21. 
129. Id. 
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sought, then it is the fault of the permit writer and the issuing 
authority.130  The court turned to the language in EPA’s General 
Permit Guidance, which states that after the five-part 
similarity131 finding is made for the general permit, “‘the actual 
development of the general permit can proceed just as for any 
individual permit.’”132  Therefore, the court did not find that 
different requirements of the general permit were reason to 
narrow the shield, but could in fact be grounds for allowing more 
leeway for permittees.133 
Sierra Club appealed to the Sixth Circuit where the Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holding.134  The court first agreed 
with the district court that the shield applies to the general 
permit by referring to EPA’s interpretation intending for the 
shield to apply to both the individual and general permit.135  
Second, the court agreed with the district court that ICG’s 
discharge of selenium satisfied the Piney Run test.136  The court 
found that ICG had met the disclosure prong of Piney Run by 
disclosing the presence of selenium with a “one-time sample at 
some time during the life of the permit.”137  KDOW was also 
aware that “the mines in the area could produce selenium,” 
satisfying the “reasonable contemplation” prong.138  The court 
cites as evidence of KDOW’s knowledge the inclusion of a one-
time monitoring requirement.139  Should KDOW had found other 
restrictions necessary for the release of selenium, the court 
discusses, it would have included them in the permit.140 
These cases present a series of highly fact-specific situations 
in which the court either broadens or narrows the scope of the 
 
130. Id. 
131. The “five-part similarity” finding refers to the criteria that the 
practices of the entire industry must meet in order to acquire a general permit. 
40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(i)(A)–(E) (2015).  
132. IGC Hazard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *19 (quoting GENERAL PERMIT 
GUIDANCE, supra note 126, at 17).  
133. See id. at *19–20.  
134. Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015). 
135. Id. at 286. 
136. Id. at 288–89.  
137. Id. at 288. 
138. Id. at 290. 
139. Id. at 283. 
140. ICG Hazard, 781 F.3d at 290. 
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permit shield in light of those facts and the holdings in Atlantic 
States, Ketchikan, and Piney Run. In examining these recent 
cases together, it seems that courts may have an easier time 
following the confines of Piney Run as it pertains to individual 
permits. However, when applying the older cases to general 
permits, the defendants’ varying circumstances raise a number of 
questions for the court. The following section dissects the recent 
case law and examines the underlying rationales behind favoring 
a broad or narrow permit shield, especially as it pertains to a 
general permit. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
The recent court decisions interpreting the scope of the 
permit shield raise important questions as to the purpose of the 
permit shield and the consequences of the shield’s coverage. A 
broad or narrow construction of the permit shield has varying 
implications for industry, administrative agencies, public interest 
groups, and communities. While all of the cases addressing the 
scope of the permit shield rely heavily on the facts of the case, 
there are some trends in the lines of argument presented by the 
parties. Arguments for a broad shield focus on the notion that 
permittees need certainty that they will be protected from 
unlimited liability, primarily from citizen suits. These permittees 
want a system that will assure their businesses the predictability 
that they need to succeed. Within this same line of reasoning is 
the argument that regulators do not provide notice, and therefore 
violate due process, when the agency promulgates regulations 
that are unclear. 
While the regulated community is understandably concerned 
about predictability, a narrow interpretation will provide 
adequate environmental protection. The Sierra Club v. ICG 
Hazard decision demonstrates the dangerous scenario in which a 
company is allowed, without limitation, to knowingly discharge 
one of the most toxic pollutants under the CWA. This decision, 
along with many of the arguments raised by the defendants in 
the recent decisions, broaden the scope of the permit shield to the 
extent that it runs counter to the fundamental premise of the 
CWA—to protect the nation’s waters from harmful discharges. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/3
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A.  Arguments favoring a broad scope 
The regulated community has highlighted the permit shield 
as a way of ensuring certainty. In a number of briefs, mining 
companies underscore the purpose of the permit shield as “giving 
permits finality.”141  This certainty, industry argues, reduces 
unknown liability which in turn helps businesses grow. Having 
the shield cover fewer pollutants, these defendants have argued, 
would leave businesses guessing as to what discharges may give 
rise to liability. 
For instance, in Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. 
Aurora Energy Services, industry associations submitted an 
amicus brief arguing that Aurora’s NPDES permit barred suit for 
air-borne coal dust released from the conveyor system.142  This 
argument was partially based on the policy that the permit shield 
“provides the finality that industry desperately needs to begin, 
conduct or expand business.”143  If EPA was aware of the 
incidental discharges of coal dust and the state authority 
specifically authorized the coal discharges under a MSGP permit, 
then how would Aurora predict liability for the discharges? The 
companies urge that this uncertainty “arising from the inability 
to rely upon” the whole suit of permits necessary to operate poses 
significant new hurdles for “moving forward with investments to 
create and expand an enterprise.”144  Permit holders argue that 
this unpredictability would lead to reduced investments in 
projects because investors would see more risk in a permit that 
does not shield liability.145  Furthermore, banks may be more 
reluctant to extend credit to such projects or would extend credit 
 
141. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).  
142. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, Alaska Cmty. 
Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Serv., LLC, 765 F.3d 1169 (2014) (No. 13-
35709); see also Crowell-Moring, LLP, Coal Loading Facility and Railroad Win 
Federal Court Endorsement of Clean Water Act’s “Permit Shield” Defense and 
Refusal to Expand Clean Water Act to Wind-Borne Dust, martindale.com (Apr. 
11, 2013), http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_Crowell-
Moring-LLP_1752044.htm [http://perma.cc/E5DF-Y3DV] (discussing the 
implications of the district court’s holding).  
143. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, supra note 142, at 
11. 
144. Id. at 26.  
145. Id. 
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at higher interest rates.146  This loss of financing could result in a 
decrease in employment and slower economic growth for 
communities.147 
The defendants’ arguments in Southern Appalachian 
Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp. (SAMS) also urged that 
the narrowing of the permit shield could give rise to unknown 
liability.148  Following SAMS, if a permittee learns of a pollutant 
that it “either knew or had any reason to believe that the element 
would be present in its discharges” at the time that it submitted 
its permit application, the permittee must immediately report it 
in order to avoid liability.149  Before SAMS, this only applied to 
those permittees who were making changes to their facilities.150  
Also, as a result of SAMS, it is clear that a permittee cannot rely 
on an authority’s awareness of a discharge or wastestreams of 
which a pollutant is a constituent element, unless the permit 
holder can show that it adequately investigated and tested the 
specific chemical levels and disclosed these test results to the 
permitting agency.151  
Along similar lines, industry raises the issue of “lack of 
notice” with the shrinking of the permit shield and how this 
narrow scope ultimately violates the fundamental right to due 
process. This is first raised in Piney Run.152  The Due Process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, “[n]o 
Person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”153  Because a business may be deprived of its 
 
146. The amicus brief contends that banks may respond to increased 
uncertainty by “rationing” credit, which, they argue, could lead to “a complete 
loss of access to the credit market for some project proponents” or could halt 
some projects altogether. Id. at 27. 
147. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, supra note 142, at 
25–30.  
148. See Brief of Appellant at 3, S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & 
G Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-2050).   
149. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 F.3d at 566. 
150. District Court Exposes Vulnerability in Clean Water Act Permit Shield, 
WARREN ENVIRONMENTAL COUNSEL LLP (July 31, 2013), http:// 
warrenglasslaw.com/district-court-exposes-vulnerability-in-clean-water-act-
permit-shield/ [http://perma.cc/SB7D-7BPX] (discussing the implications of the 
District Court’s ruling that was later affirmed by the Fourth Circuit). 
151. Id. 
152. See Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 16–17, Piney 
Run Pres. Ass’n, v. Comm’r of Carroll County, 268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2014).  
153. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/3
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property or liberty through a violation of agency regulations, 
courts frequently examine whether an agency gave fair notice to a 
regulated entity.154 
In Piney Run, an amicus brief in support of the defendants 
referred to the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in General Electric v. EPA in 
which the court found that fair notice is not provided unless a 
regulated entity, acting in good faith, is able to identify with 
“ascertainable certainty” the standards with which the agency 
expects it to conform.155  A regulation denies due process “if it is 
so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as 
to the conduct that prohibits” it.156  In Piney Run, the defendants 
claimed that they were denied due process because there was no 
temperature limitation on any publically owned treatment facility 
in Maryland and neither EPA nor the Maryland Department of 
the Environment had ever found the defendant permittees in 
violation of their permit for discharging heat.157 
Another issue that these recent cases have raised is the 
burden of having to disclose many pollutants in order to be 
covered by the permit shield. The CWA defines the term 
“pollutant” very broadly.158  In Piney Run, the court wrote, “this 
definition is extremely broad, covering innumerable individual 
substances.”159  One amicus brief submitted by the industry 
groups in support of the defendants in Piney Run writes that, as a 
practical matter, it would be impossible to disclose every 
pollutant in an effluent.160  The brief highlights that this is the 
 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d 455, 458–59 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that a defendant in compliance with regulations as codified 
cannot be found in violation of the Clean Air Act where EPA proposes an 
amendment to the regulations to prohibit defendant’s conduct); Howmet Corp. v. 
EPA, 614 F.3d 544, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. Trident Seafoods 
Corp., 60 F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he responsibility to promulgate clear 
and unambiguous standards is on the [agency]. The test is not what [the agency] 
might possibly have intended, but what [was] said. If the language is faulty, the 
[agency] had the means and obligation to amend.”). 
155. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 17–18 
(citing General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).  
156. Id. at 17 (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966)). 
157. Id. at 18. 
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012). 
159. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255, 
271 (4th Cir. 2001). 
160. Amicus Brief in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 22, Piney Run 
Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d 255 (Nos. 00-1283 & 00-1322).  
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case partly because facilities cannot control all water that runs on 
and off of its site.161 Some of these pollutants occur naturally, 
such as selenium.162  In fact, the brief argues, even if a facility 
discharged distilled water, there would still be some traces of 
pollutants the facility could not control.163  The court in Atlantic 
States made a similar conclusion in noting that there is “no 
principled reason why water itself, which is conceded to be a 
chemical, would not be considered a ‘pollutant’ under . . . the 
Act.”164 
This unknown liability is an extremity that EPA tried to 
avoid in its creation of the NPDES permitting system. The 
government quickly realized that asking industry to only comply 
with the parameters of a permit made facilities too susceptible to 
litigation because “anybody seeking to harass a permittee need 
only analyze that permittee’s discharge until determining the 
presence of a substance not identified in the permit.”165  Under 
the Refuse Act, the government aggressively filed suits against 
polluters by constantly expanding what qualified as a pollutant 
and would bring suits based on “technical violations” of the 
permit.166  EPA therefore rejected this approach under the Refuse 
Act permitting system.167  Despite this change in policy, the 
recent court interpretations of the permit shield could arguably 
“expose permittees to untold liability and largely vitiate the 
CWA’s permit shield protection for the majority of NPDES permit 
holders.”168 
EPA has also acknowledged this argument in its guidance 
policy, stating that it is impossible to identify and limit every 
chemical present in a discharge.169  Furthermore, the EAB noted 
in the Ketchikan decision that the “goals of the CWA may be more 
 
161. Id. at 23. 
162. Id. at 22. 
163. Id. at 24. 
164. Atl. States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
165. Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, supra note 42, at 2.  
166. Id. 
167. Id.  
168. Richard Davis & Mackenzie Schoonmaker, The Fourth Circuit Limits 
the Clean Water Act’s Permit Shield Defense, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, PC (July 
15, 2014), http://www.bdlaw.com/news-1619.html [https://perma.cc/ZE4W-PL6J]. 
169. Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, supra note 42, at 2. 
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effectively achieved by focusing on the chief pollutants and 
wastestreams established in effluent guidelines and disclosed by 
permittees in their permit applications.”170  From an 
administrative standpoint, it would therefore be infeasible to 
“contemplate” every pollutant that could possibly be present in a 
discharge. In drafting a permit, the permit writer must conduct 
all of the steps mentioned above171 while thoroughly documenting 
his or her decision-making process.172  If a permit writer must 
examine and draft limitations for hundreds of pollutants, this 
could create more room for error in a process that is already 
considered to be quite tedious. It would be infeasible, even with 
unlimited resources, to set limitations for so many pollutants. 
B. A Narrow Interpretation of the Permit Shield Should 
Control 
Although the permit shield is meant to give some relief to 
industry, it should still be viewed within the context and purpose 
of the CWA—to restore and maintain the physical, chemical, and 
biological integrity of the nation’s waters.173  A narrow 
interpretation of the permit shield aligns closely with this 
underlying premise because it encourages careful and full 
disclosure of pollutants and compliance with one’s permit. Based 
on the recent case law, a narrow interpretation includes requiring 
that permittees comply with all conditions of their permit in order 
for the shield to apply, requiring full disclosure at the beginning 
of a permit’s issuance, and raising the bar for what is deemed 
“reasonable contemplation” by the agency. The following 
discussion provides the basis for these requirements and 
responses to the regulated community’s concerns. 
First and foremost, the permit shield should not extend to 
those who do not comply with all permit conditions (not simply 
effluent limitations). In Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. 
Marfork Coal Co., the defendant mining company attempted to 
persuade the court that it should be afforded the permit shield 
even though the coal mine’s discharges of selenium violated state 
 
170. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 618 (EAB 1998). 
171. See supra Part I(B). 
172. See NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL, supra note 32, at 3-3 to -5.  
173. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
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water quality provisions.174  This argument implies that even if 
the permittee passes the Piney Run test, the permittee is free of 
liability despite having violated another condition of the 
permit.175 
Another problem with allowing a permittee to claim the 
permit shield defense in the Ohio Valley situation is that the 
permittee would not have to report compliance with all provisions 
in a permit.176  Instead, the permittee would only have to report 
the effluent limits because no other condition in the permit would 
be enforceable.177  There are many terms and conditions in a 
permit that are not part of the effluent limitations and are 
essential to safeguarding the environment.178  Not allowing the 
enforceability of these conditions would be inconsistent with 
federal case law that finds all terms and conditions of a permit to 
be enforceable.179  Furthermore, since provisions like water 
quality standards would not be enforceable, citizens would be 
prohibited from bringing enforcement actions when a permittee 
violated such provisions.180  The court’s refusal to grant the 
permit shield defense in Ohio Valley will encourage permit 
holders to comply not only with the effluent standards in a 
permit, but any other conditions that are cross-referenced in the 
permit. 
With respect to the first prong under Piney Run, a narrow 
interpretation raises the standard for what is deemed to be full 
and honest disclosure of an applicant’s discharges. This 
interpretation is best demonstrated by the court’s refusal to grant 
 
174. 966 F. Supp. 2d 667, 676 (S.D.W. Va. 2013). 
175. Id. at 677. 
176. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–24, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. Inc. v. 
Marfork Coal Co., 966 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D.W. Va. 2013) (No. 5:12-01464). 
177. Id. at 24. 
178. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (2015). In addition to these federally required 
provisions, state permits adopt provisions that may be even stricter than those 
designated by the EPA.  
179. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 
204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff citizen groups had standing 
to sue defendant facility for discharging pollutants into a lake and that 
defendant was liable for not complying with all provisions of its permit); Sierra 
Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that the 
defendant manufacturer failed to comply with all provisions of its NPDES 
permit). 
180. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 176, at 18–24. 
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the permit shield defense in SAMS v. A & G Coal Corp. The 
Fourth Circuit’s reading of the “know or reason to believe” 
provision requires that applicants affirmatively state whether 
they know of the presence of a pollutant.181  Accordingly, an 
applicant may not plead ignorance by failing to test for a 
regulated pollutant and then simply not provide any information 
regarding that pollutant because the applicant has “no reason to 
believe” of its presence.182 
The decision in SAMS is significant because it recognizes the 
burden that the CWA places on an applicant to make an honest 
inquiry into the pollutants listed in the regulations. If the court 
had accepted A & G’s argument it would have extended the 
permit shield to permit holders who assumed a more passive role 
in the disclosure process.183  Instead, by taking a narrow 
interpretation of the permit shield, the court establishes that the 
permit shield should only be available to those who follow permit 
requirements and who put forward the adequate disclosures 
necessary for the permitting authority to reasonably contemplate 
the threat of a pollutant to the environment. 
In the context of the general permit, arguments embracing a 
narrow shield apply the appropriate timing and standard for 
“reasonable contemplation” under the second prong of the Piney 
Run test. The Fourth Circuit held in Piney Run that discharges 
not within the reasonable contemplation of the permitting 
authority during the permit application process . . . do not come 
within the protection of the permit shield.”184  The timing for the 
application process differs for the individual and general permit. 
In the context of the general permit, the application process 
occurs before the issuance of the general permit, not when a 
permit applicant submits an NOI for coverage.185 
The relevant time period for the application process is 
significant because it determines whether a pollutant was 
 
181. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560, 
567 (4th Cir. 2014). 
182. Id. at 569.  
183. Id. 
184. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255, 
268 (4th Cir. 2001).  
185. Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Assoc. v. EPA, 410 F.3d 
964, 978 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding the notice and comment phase the “application 
process” of the general permit).   
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reasonably contemplated by the agency in the issuance of the 
permit.  In Aurora Energy Services, EPA submitted an amicus 
brief arguing that the district court had wrongly considered 
Aurora’s submission of its NOI as the permit process.186  EPA 
explains that the NOI is not an application, but rather an 
administrative requirement.187  Unlike the issuance of the 
general permit itself, the NOI does not undergo public notice and 
comment. Thus, any disclosures made during the NOI phase 
cannot be deemed within “the reasonable contemplation” of the 
permitting authority. For a court to hold to the contrary would 
encourage permit holders to make disclosures during the NOI 
phase and then claim protection by the permit shield even if these 
pollutants are not actually covered by the general permit.188 
Tying in closely with the issue of timing, courts should also 
refrain from extending the permit shield to companies that do not 
provide sufficient information for a pollutant to be within the 
contemplation of the permit authority. In comparison to what was 
originally established by the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit in 
ICG Hazard lowered the standard of proof for what is “reasonably 
contemplated” by the agency.189  Piney Run and EPA have firmly 
established disclosures must be adequate for the regulator to 
determine whether or not there is a threat posed by the release of 
a pollutant.190  In ICG Hazard, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a 
one-time sampling requirement and the Kentucky Division of 
Water’s “knowledge” that mines in the area could produce 
selenium was sufficient to show that KDOW had “reasonably 
contemplated” the release of selenium.191  However, there was no 
evidence that ICG had disclosed the presence of selenium when 
the general permit was issued. 
 
186. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 25–
39, Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Servs., LLC, 765 F.3d 1169 
(2012) (No. 13-35709), 2014 WL 1319629, at *25–39.  
187. Id. at 35. 
188. Id. at 38. 
189. See Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281, 283, 290 (6th Cir. 
2015). 
190. See Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 
255, 268 (4th Cir. 2001); Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A. 
Herman & Jean C. Nelson (July 1, 1994), supra note 42, at 1–2. 
191. ICG Hazard, 781 F.3d at 283, 290. 
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Following the low standard of “contemplation” set forth in 
ICG Hazard, mines that operate under general permits may 
avoid disclosing the presence of toxic pollutants in their 
discharges. The permit holder would only need to show that there 
was some scintilla of evidence that the permitting authority had 
reason to know permittees in the region could possibly release the 
pollutant. This is a significantly lower standard than in Piney 
Run in which the defendants provided a “significant compilation 
of the daily reports” to the permitting authority that contained 
information on the pollutant at issue in the case.192  Going 
forward, courts should follow Piney Run more closely so there is 
further incentive for permit holders, even those operating under 
the general permit, to provide detailed disclosures to the agency. 
Permit holders who are not forthcoming about the nature of their 
discharges to the extent that the permitting authority cannot 
assess the threat to the environment, should not satisfy the 
“reasonable contemplation” prong of the Piney Run test. 
Industry’s fear of “untold liability” and loss of business over 
the unavailability of the permit shield is an outdated argument. 
It would make little sense for a citizen or regulator to bring an 
action against a permit holder because they are discharging non-
hazardous pollutants. The obvious disincentive for a regulator is 
time and resources. As has been noted, “the Agency has 
determined that the goals of the CWA may be more effectively 
achieved by focusing on the chief pollutants and wastestreams 
established in effluent guidelines and disclosed by permittees in 
their permits.”193  For citizens, the disincentive is a court’s 
stringent requirements for standing. In making a motion for 
injunctive relief, a citizen must show that he or she has suffered 
irreparable harm from the violation.194  Such restraints would 
limit authorities and citizens from bringing frivolous lawsuits 
only to harass regulated entities. 
Instead of urging the courts to expand the scope of the permit 
shield, the most logical recourse for industry is to be meticulous 
in disclosing all hazardous pollutants so they are “reasonably 
contemplated” by the regulator. Following Ohio Valley, Aurora 
Energy Services, SAMS, and ICG Hazard, mines and other 
 
192. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 271. 
193. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 618 (EAB 1998). 
194. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541 (1987). 
27
RICH - FINAL 4/26/2016  1:43 PM 
2016] TROUBLING WATERS 277 
regulated entities must closely review all provisions of the 
NPDES permit application in order to ensure they provide 
answers to all the questions that have been asked by the 
regulatory agency. Otherwise, applicants risk not putting their 
entire discharge within the “contemplation” of the agency. This is 
a positive outcome for citizens who want to encourage permit 
holders to be more thorough in their application process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the permit shield is meant to be an exception to the 
strict liability of the CWA, it must still be viewed in light of the 
overall purposes of the statute—to protect the quality of U.S. 
waters. The above discussion shows that a narrow interpretation 
of the permit shield provides incentive for permit holders to 
strictly comply with the terms of their permits and to fully 
disclose their discharges so they are within the contemplation of 
the permitting authority. This interpretation does not neglect 
industry. Industry is still afforded great protection from the 
permit shield and continues to benefit from its reassurances. It is 
the role of the courts and federal and state agencies to continue to 
clarify the nuances in the CWA, while citizens continue to enjoy 
and protect our most valuable resource. 
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